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Business Standing Under the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act:
An Attempt to Resolve the Confusion
EDWARD X. CLINTON, JR.*

The Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act'

("the Act") prohibits unfair methods of competition and "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices" used in the conduct of "any trade or commerce." 2 A
successful plaintiff can recover actual damages, punitive damages and
attorney's fees.3 The Act also benefits individual consumers by eliminating
the requirements that plaintiff prove reliance or that the seller acted in bad
4

faith.

Businesses have also brought claims under the Act. Illinois courts have
used several standards to determine whether a business has standing. As I
will explain, these standards are in conflict. Recently, the courts have held
that a business may bring a claim where the defendant's conduct implicates
consumer protection concerns. I will argue that this standard has allowed
businesses to bring consumer fraud claims where it is unclear whether the
claim really serves consumer protection interests. Next, I will discuss how
other states with similar statutes have determined whether a business has
standing. I will propose that the requirements for business standing in
Illinois should be altered to better reflect the policies behind the Act. Under

* A.B., University of Chicago; J.D., Harvard Law School. Clinton is an associate
with Katten, Muchin & Zavis in Chicago, Illinois, where he handles commercial litigation.
The views reflected herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of Katten,
Muchin & Zavis or its clients.
1. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 505/1 to /12 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996).
2. § 505/2.
3. A successful plaintiff under the Act can recover "actual economic damages or any
other relief which the court deems proper." § 505/10a(a) (Supp. 1996). "Economic" was
added in 1996. Id.; see also § 505/10a(c) (allowing recovery of punitive damages and
"reasonable attorney's fees and costs").
4. A plaintiff "need not show actual reliance nor diligence in ascertaining the accuracy
of the misstatements." Harkala v. Wildwood Realty, Inc., 558 N.E.2d 195, 199 (111.
App. Ct.
1990) ("The good or bad faith of the seller is irrelevant under the Act; consequently, a
plaintiff can recover for even innocent misrepresentations. "),see also Siegel v. Levy Org.
Dev. Co., 607 N.E.2d 194, 198 (II1. 1992) ("the Act does not require actual reliance").
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the proposed standard, a business should only be able to make a claim under
the Act where it is acting in a consumer-oriented manner, such as
purchasing goods or services for use in the business.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ACT
The Act uses broad and sweeping terms to define the plaintiff and what
activities are covered. The Act contains an expansive definition of the
plaintiff. Section 10(a) of the Act states that "[a]ny person who suffers
actual damage as a result of a violation of this Act committed by any other
5
person may bring an action against such person." The Act states that
"'person' includes any natural person or his legal representative, partnership,
corporation (domestic and foreign), company, trust, business entity or
association, and any agent, employee, salesman, partner, officer, director,
6
member, stockholder, associate, trustee or cestui que trust thereof." Under
the statutory language a business is clearly a "person."
Although the Act states that a person may bring a claim, it also defines
the term "consumer.."...[Clonsumer' means any person who purchases or
contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary
course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his
household." 7 The Act allows a "person" to bring a lawsuit but it does not
require that each "person" bringing a lawsuit must also be a "consumer."
As we shall see, however, some courts have required that a plaintiff be a
consumer. The vast majority of Illinois courts have rejected this view.
The Act applies to any "trade or commerce."' The definition of "trade
or commerce" is extremely broad. It includes: "the advertising, offering for
sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or
intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or
thing of value wherever situated, and shall include any trade or commerce
9
Under this
directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State."
sale of
the
expansive definition almost any business contract involving
goods or services qualifies as "trade or commerce." In sum, the statute is
broadly drafted.

5. § 505/10a(a) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). The word "actual" was added in
1996. Id.
6. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 505/1(c) (West 1993).
7. § 505/1(e).
8. § 505/2.
9. § 505/1(f).
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HI. THE ACT'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The 1973 amendments to the Act allowed private parties to sue for the
first time. Those amendments essentially established the current structure
of the Act. The legislative history for the 1973 amendments makes clear
that the Act was intended to end deceptive and abusive practices which
harmed consumers. Senator Sours stated:
This bill is very broad. It encompasses just about every
conceivable transaction wherein the unwary are persuaded
to part with their treasure by the huckster and the slicker
and the camivallian and the advertiser and those who use
the mail to defraud honest ...otherwise honest people.
...I want to repeat as of now that we have done absolutely nil for the consumer in this State by any State
legislation . .

.

.This is a good legislation .

. .

. I'd

appreciate a favorable roll call because this is something
this State truly needs.'
The Senator's comments make clear that the Act's primary purpose was to
protect individual consumers.
The legislative history also 'discusses the Act's broad definition of
"trade or commerce." Senator Sours commented:
This would be equivalent to the little FTC. It covers most
of the deceptive practices, if it doesn't cover them all, I'll
be greatly mistaken. It empowers, not only damages, but
injunctive relief. . . . This bill and this idea [have] been
long in coming .... This, in my opinion, is sufficiently
all-inclusive to solve most of the problems of people
being defrauded, cheated, in many instances without
remedy. ....
"

The legislative history does not discuss business standing. The main
purpose of the Act was to protect individual consumers from deceptive
practices. Although the legislators did not mention business standing, they
included businesses and corporations in the definition of "person."2
Moreover, the legislators did not require that the plaintiff be a "consumer,"

10. Transcript of the Illinois Senate Debates of the 78th General Assembly, Day #79,
at 265-66 (June 30, 1973).
11. Transcript of the Illinois Senate Debates of the 78th General Assembly, Day #75,
at 69 (June 30, 1973).
12. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/1(c) (West 1993).
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even though that term was included in the Act. From these facts we can
conclude that the legislature also intended to protect businesses from
exploitive practices.
Ill. THE COURTS' EFFORTS To DEFINE BUSINESS STANDING
A. PRIOR TO THE 1990 AMENDMENT

Because the Act provides little guidance and because the legislative
history does not mention business claims, Illinois courts have struggled to

define an appropriate test for business standing. Prior to 1990, courts used
many different tests to determine whether a business had standing to bring

a claim against another business. A few courts simply denied standing
where a business pursued a claim against another business on the ground

that the Act was limited to consumers. 3
Most courts, however, required business plaintiffs to establish some sort
of injury to consumers. Even this test was formulated in several ways.
Some courts required plaintiffs to prove public or consumer injury, or actual
injury to consumers. 4 One court disputed that there was any requirement
to allege public injury. 15 Other courts stated that the public injury requirement did not apply where the business purchased services or goods for its
own use."6 In WE. O'Neil, the plaintiff was a construction company
which purchased insurance from the defendant insurer. Plaintiff claimed
that the defendant misrepresented that it would pay a claim. Although the
dispute was between two businesses, plaintiff had standing because plaintiff
purchased insurance for its own use.' 7

13. See, e.g., Century Universal Enter. Inc. v. Triana Dev. Corp., 510 N.E.2d 1260,
1270 (I11.
App. Ct. 1987) (stating that corporation lacked standing to pursue claim against
former partners in a real estate venture because it was not a consumer).
14. See Jays Foods, Inc. v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 364, 369 (N.D. I11.
1987)
(dismissingclaim that defendant had limited plaintiffs access to shelf space in stores because
plaintiff had not proved "consumer injury"); First Comics, Inc. v. World Color Press, Inc.,
672 F. Supp. 1064, 1065 (N.D. III. 1987) (dismissing an action alleging discriminatory
pricing by a supplier because plaintiff could not prove consumer injury), aff'd, 884 F.2d 1033
(7th Cir. 1989); see also Ashkanazy v. I. Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1527, 1557
(N.D. I11.
1991) (portions of lawsuit alleging unfair trade practices dismissedwhere plaintiff
could not demonstrate injury to consumers generally).
15. M & W Gear Co. v. A.W. Dynamometer, Inc., 424 N.E.2d 356, 365 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981) (holding that the Act contained no public injury requirement).
16. W.E. O'Neil Const. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp. 984, 1001
(N.D. 111.
1989) (plaintiff had standing where defendant insurer failed to pay a claim on
plaintiffs general liability policy).
17. Id. at 1001-02.
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Other courts denied standing in certain cases on the ground that the
injury alleged was "a purely private wrong."'" For example, in Frahm v.
Urkovich, 9 plaintiffs alleged that their former attorney violated the Act by
inducing them into entering into an unfavorable real estate transaction. The
court denied standing on the ground that the practice did not "affect
consumers generally" and was "a purely private wrong."2" Neither the Act
nor its legislative history provides a definition for the term "purely private
wrong." Frahm implies that an act which did not affect consumers
generally was a "purely private wrong." Similarly, the contract dispute in
Beaton & Associates" was viewed as a "purely private wrong" because no
consumers were directly involved in the dispute.
In a slight variation on the public injury test, a few courts required the
plaintiff to prove that defendant's conduct "involves trade practices
addressed to the market generally or otherwise implicates consumer
protection concerns."22 This test differs from the public injury requirement
because a practice might implicate consumer protection concerns without
actually injuring consumers.
A few courts developed a fourth approach. Instead of requiring public
or consumer injury, these courts required a plaintiff to prove a pattern of
deceptive acts by the defendant.23 It is difficult to reconcile such a
requirement with the text of the 1973 Act. The pattern, however, could be
established with evidence of other similar acts. A merchant making a
similar misrepresentation to several customers would meet this requirement.
Although the pattern requirement limits claims under the Act, it does not
distinguish between consumer and non-consumer claims. The pattern
requirement has been used to dismiss claims by individual consumers.24
18. See, e.g., Beaton & Assocs., Ltd. v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 512 N.E.2d 1286,
1293 (111. App. Ct. 1987) (dismissing a consumer fraud claim in the context of a business
contract dispute on the ground that the dispute was a "purely private wrong").
19. 447 N.E.2d 1007 (I1. App. Ct. 1983).

20. Id.at 1011.
21. 512 N.E.2d 286 (Il. App. Ct. 1987).

22. Downers Grove Volkswagen, Inc. v. Wigglesworth Imports, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 33,
41 (111. App. Ct. 1989).

23. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alejandro Alfonzo-Larrain R., 590 F. Supp. 1083, 1088
(N.D. Ill.
1984) (requiring plaintiff to allege both an injury to consumers generally and a

pattern of deceptive acts by the defendant).
24. See Jones v. Universal Casualty Co., 630 N.E.2d 94, 103 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994)
(holding plaintiff's claim that defendant insurer wrongfully denied coverage on the basis of
policy claim notice provisions failed because plaintiffs could not establish that the provisions
"caused substantial injury to consumers."); Golembiewski v. Hallberg Ins. Agency, Inc., 635
N.E.2d 452 (11. App. Ist Dist. 1994) (holding that plaintiff's claim failed because plaintiff

had not demonstrated that defendant had a pattern of treating other consumers in a similar
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Thus, prior to 1990, the courts used several contradictory tests in
resolving business claims. It appears that the courts were making an effort
to use the various tests to exclude certain claims from the Act. However,
several tests made no distinction between claims by businesses and claims
by private plaintiffs. Indeed, the pattern requirement and the "purely private
wrong" doctrine were used by some courts to dismiss claims by individual
consumers. The courts made no effort to resolve the conflicts in the test for
business standing.
B. THE 1990 AMENDMENT

In 1990, the legislature abolished several defenses to consumer fraud
claims. It added a sentence to section 10a(a): "Proof of a public injury, a
pattern, or an effect on consumers generally shall not be required."2 5 The
amendment abolished the public or consumer injury requirement. The
amendment, however, was not intended to open the door to all types of
business claims. In a discussion of the proposed amendment, State
Representative Terzich stated: "This legislation would clarify that there is
no such [public injury] requirement in order for a plaintiff, [sic] to be
protected under this Act. They [sic] must prove that some sort of consumer
protection ... concern is involved."2 6 The comment implies that to have
standing a plaintiff must show some connection to consumer protection
concerns. The legislature wanted the Act to protect consumers. The
legislature did not comment that it intended the amendment to open the door
to all types of business disputes.
Courts viewed the amendment as a clarification of the Act's original
meaning, not a substantive change to the Act. The Seventh Circuit held that
the amendment was "a legislative interpretation of the original statute" and
was therefore retroactive. 2 ' The Illinois First District Appellate Court also
held that the amendment applied retroactively.2
fashion).
25. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 505/10a(a) (West 1993), amended by § 505110a(a)
(Supp. 1996). This sentence was deleted in 1995 when the Act was amended to include a
public injury requirement for claims against new and used vehicle dealers. The section now
reads "Proof of a public injury, a pattern, or an effect on consumers and the public interest
generally shall be required in order to state a cause of action against a [new or used vehicle
dealer]."
26. Transcript of the Illinois House Debates of the 86th General Assembly, Day 46,
at 136-37 (May 23, 1989) (emphasis added).
27. Hardin, Rodriguez & Boivin Anesthesiologists, Ltd. v. Paradigm Ins. Co., 962 F.2d
628, 638 (7th Cir. 1992).
28. See Royal Imperial Group, Inc. v. Joseph Blumberg & Assocs., Inc., 608 N.E.2d
178, 183 (111. App. Ct. 1992); Rubin v. Marshall Field & Co., 597 N.E.2d 688, 694 (Ill. App.
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C. BUSINESS STANDING AFTER THE 1990 AMENDMENT

In response to the amendment, the courts have required that a business
plaintiff must allege that the defendant's actions implicate consumer
protection concerns.29 Illinois courts seem to have abandoned the other
tests used before 1990.30
The Illinois Second Appellate District held in Law Offices of William
J. Stogsdill v. Cragin Fed. Bank1 that a business has standing when it
purchases goods or services for its own use.32 In Stogsdill, the plaintiff
law firm opened a checking account at the defendant bank. The law firm
incurred losses when the bank paid certain checks which were allegedly
unauthorized by the firm. The bank's argument that the Act did not apply
to a dispute between two businesses was rejected because the law firm was
a consumer of the bank's services. According to the Act, a consumer is
''any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not
for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business." Because the law
firm was not attempting to resell the banking services, it was a "consumer"
and could sue under the Act. From the holding in Stogsdill it would
logically follow that a business which purchases goods for resale does not
have standing. A business reselling goods does not consume them. It does
not resemble a consumer.3 3 Such a business presumably has sufficient
resources at its disposal to protect its legal rights. With access to the
remedies of the Uniform Commercial Code it does not need the additional
protections of the Act. The Act's fee shifting provisions were designed to
make it easier for consumers to assert their legal rights against financially
stronger opponents.

Ct. 1992). One commentator has argued that by amending the Act "the legislature has
proclaimed that the Consumer Fraud Act never contained a public injury requirement."
Joseph G. Feehan, The IllinoisConsumerFraudAct and the "PublicInjury"Debate,80 ILL.
B.J. 136, 142 (1992).
29. Lake County Grading Co. of Libertyville, Inc. v. Advance Mechanical Contractors,
Inc., 654 N.E.2d 1109, 1115 (I11.App. Ct. 1995).
30. See, e.g., Empire Home Servs., Inc. v. Carpet America, Inc., 653 N.E.2d 852, 854
(I11.App. Ct. 1995) (holding that the Act no longer requires proof of public injury).
31. 645 N.E.2d 564 (Ii. App. Ct. 1995).

32. Id. at 566 (holding that plaintiff law firm with a checking account at a bank could

maintain an action under the Act where the bank had allegedly cashed checks which were not
authorized by plaintiff); see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
33. The Northern District of Illinois, in an unpublished opinion, dismissed a consumer
fraud claim by a manufacturer under this reasoning. CTS Corp. v. Raytheon Co., No. 92C3878, 1993 U.S. Dist. (LEXIS) 6442, at *7-11 (N.D. I1l. May 11, 1993) (plaintiff
manufacturer could not maintain claim where it alleged that defendant's goods had been
incorporated into products sold to customers).
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A claim that a business breached a contract with another business does
not state a claim under the Act where the breach does not implicate
consumer protection concerns. In Lake County Grading, the plaintiff was
a subcontractor which contracted with the defendant general contractor to
install a sewer line.34 Plaintiff initially installed the line in the wrong
location. At defendant's request plaintiff moved the line to the correct
location. Defendant paid for the installation, but not the relocation.
Plaintiff claimed that defendant breached an oral contract to pay for the
relocation and that the breach violated the Act. The claim under the Act
failed because plaintiff could not demonstrate that its claim implicated
consumer protection concerns.35
Nor does a claim that one business misappropriated trade secrets owned
by another business appear to state a claim under the Act.36 A business
which steals its competitor's trade secrets is not acting like an ordinary
consumer and its actions (while illegal) do not appear to implicate consumer
protection concerns.
A claim that another business has used false advertising to disparage
plaintiffs product is sufficient to obtain standing under the Act because
false advertising affects individual consumers. 37 In Downers Grove
Volkswagen, the defendant car dealer distributed brochures to consumers
which allegedly contained misstatements concerning plaintiffs products.
Because the advertisements were intended to affect consumers' opinions,
plaintiffs claim implicated consumer protection concerns.
Thus, after the 1990 amendment, the Illinois courts have abandoned the
public or consumer injury and pattern limitations on claims under the Act.
The courts have continued to dismiss business claims where the claims have
little to do with consumer protection concerns.

34. Lake County Grading, 654 N.E.2d at 1109 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
35. Id. at 1116 (commenting that "if litigants could invoke the Act merely by alleging
an intentional or fraudulent breach of contract, common-law breach of contract actions would
be supplemented in every case with an additional and redundant remedy under the Act.").
36. See Web Communications Group, Inc. v. Gateway 2000, 889 F. Supp. 316 (N.D.
111. 1995) (plaintiff alleging that defendant misappropriated its advertisement designs could
not state a claim because the Act applies only to conduct with some connection to
consumers).
37. See, e.g., Downers Grove Volkswagen, Inc. v. Wigglesworth Imports, Inc., 546
N.E.2d 33 (111. App. Ct. 1989); Lampi Corp. v. American Power Prods. Inc., No. 93-C1225,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12828 (N.D. II. Sep. 9, 1994) (consumer fraud counterclaim stated
a cause of action where defendant alleged that plaintiff had made false and misleading
statements concerning its products).
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IV. BUSINESS STANDING IN ILLINOIS
WHERE OTHER CONSUMERS HAVE BEEN INJURED

One problem with the Illinois test is that it is difficult to determine
whether a specific practice actually implicates consumer protection concerns.
It is possible that a dispute between a manufacturer and a wholesaler might
have an impact on consumers. Yet neither the manufacturer nor the
wholesaler is consuming goods or services.
This problem has arisen in recent decisions in which a business sues
another business and seeks standing as a consumer by arguing that
individual consumers were injured. Two types of Illinois decisions have
faced this issue. Several cases have allowed a business to claim that a
competitor has used false advertising to disparage the business's products.3"
As explained above, cases similar to Downers Grove Volkswagen should not
be controversial because false advertising cannot benefit consumers.
Recently, however, several courts have also granted standing where the
business plaintiff alleges that a practice has caused financial injury to other
consumers. Sullivan's Wholesale Drug Co. v. Faryl's Pharmacy,Inc.39 is
the leading case. In Sullivan's, the plaintiff pharmacy alleged that the
defendants were involved in a kickback scheme involving the sale of
prescription drugs to nursing home residents. Prior to the dispute, plaintiff
acted as the pharmacy for the nursing home and billed the residents directly
for any drugs purchased. The dispute arose when the nursing home changed
the arrangement. Under the new arrangement the pharmacy would continue
to distribute drugs to the residents but the nursing home would handle the
billing and add a fifteen percent service fee to each invoice. The residents
were unaware that they were paying this additional fee. The plaintiff
pharmacy objected to the new arrangement and complained that the fifteen
percent fee was a kickback. The nursing home terminated the plaintiff and
replaced it with another "pharmacy. According to the plaintiff pharmacy,
under the new arrangement the residents paid higher prices for medications.
The plaintiff sued the nursing home and the replacement pharmacy, alleging
that they had violated the Act by terminating the plaintiff and charging the
fifteen percent fee to the residents. The defendants objected that the
plaintiff was not a "consumer," but the court rejected the objection.40

38. See, e.g., Downers Grove Volkswagen, 546 N.E.2d at 33; Empire Home Servs.,
Inc. v. Carpet America, Inc., 653 N.E.2d 852, 854 (111.App. Ct. 1995).
39. 573 N.E.2d 1370 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
40. Id. at 1376; see also Fry v. UAL Corp., 136 F.R.D. 626 (N.D. III. 1991) (holding
that the Consumer Fraud Act is not limited to consumers).
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In Gadson v. Newman, 4 the court followed Sullivan's to reach a
similar result where a plaintiff psychiatrist complained that another
psychiatrist was paid a fee by the defendant hospital while plaintiff did not
receive such a fee.42 In Gadson, the plaintiff was a psychiatrist who
entered into a contract to serve as the director of a hospital's family
psychiatric unit. One defendant, also a psychiatrist, entered into a contract
to manage a different psychiatric program at the hospital. The hospital
agreed to pay the defendant psychiatrist ninety dollars per day per patient
admitted to the hospital. Plaintiff, who was not receiving the fee, alleged
that the fee agreement violated the Act. The court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss on the ground that the fee might increase the cost of
healthcare to patients, who were unaware that they were paying the fee.43
The holdings of Sullivan's, Gadson and Zinser allow a business
plaintiff to obtain consumer standing where the business alleges that other
consumers were injured. The reasoning of these decisions can be questioned
because the individual consumers were not parties to the lawsuits. Even if
all three plaintiffs prevailed in court, the individual consumers would not
have obtained any portion of the recovery. Indeed, all three cases appear
to be typical disputes between business people. The owners of the plaintiff
pharmacy in Sullivan's were almost certainly unhappy when their contract
was terminated. It is unlikely that the owners were equally outraged that the
consumers were allegedly damaged by the new billing arrangement.
There is a more significant problem with allowing a business to obtain
standing where it alleges that individual consumers are injured by a financial
dispute between two businesses. How can the court be sure that the
business is not attempting to increase costs to consumers? It is readily
apparent that the interests of businesses and those of consumers are often in
conflict. For example, in Gadson, the plaintiff psychiatrist was almost
certainly not attempting to reduce costs to consumers. He wanted to be paid
the same ninety-dollar fee that another psychiatrist was receiving from the
defendant hospital. If plaintiff were to win his case, two psychiatrists would
be receiving a ninety-dollar fee, not one. Such a result could only increase
costs to consumers. Thus, it appears that granting standing to the plaintiff
because he claimed that his lawsuit implicated consumer-protection concerns

41. 807 F. Supp. 1412 (C.D. I11.1992).
42. Id. at 1414.
43. Id. at 1420-21; see alsoZinser v. Rose, 614 N.E.2d 1259, 1263 (I11.App. Ct. 1993)

(granting standing to a group of chiropractors alleging that the defendant insurance company
did not properly review insurance claims submitted by their patients and that this practice
allowed the defendant to reduce its payments to claimants because the practice implicated
consumer protection concerns).
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might actually harm consumers. In any event, because the consumers were
not parties to the lawsuit, the court was without the benefit of their views
concerning the ninety-dollar fee. Without the input of the consumers, the
court could not determine whether the fee benefitted or harmed consumers.
Similarly, in Sullivan 's, the court may have Ireasoned that granting
consumer standing to the pharmacy would carry out the purposes of the Act
by protecting the resident consumers. One might argue that the residents
would benefit if the plaintiff won the lawsuit because the court might
declare the fee illegal. However, it is possible that the residents benefitted
from the service charge."' The charge may have reduced overall expenses
for the nursing home, which may have passed the reduction on to the
resident consumers. Because the residents were not represented in the
litigation it is impossible to determine if they were harmed by the service
charge. If the Act's main purpose is to protect consumers from exploitation,
allowing the pharmacy to recover may not serve that purpose.
The decisions in Zinser, Gadson and Sullivan's will encourage
attorneys to allege that every routine business dispute implicates consumer
protection concerns. It is unlikely that a business plaintiff will seek standing
to protect the rights of consumers. It is more likely that the business
plaintiff will seek standing under the Act to maximize its own recovery by
obtaining reduced proof requirements and, if it recovers, attorney's fees.
Courts should not assume that a business will adequately protect the interests
of consumers because that assumption contradicts the premise of the Act.
The premise of the Act is that consumers need protection from businesses
that often exploit consumers.45 The courts should instead assume that
consumers can best protect their own interests. Indeed, if the patients in
Gadson believed that the ninety-dollar fee was a consumer fraud, they could
certainly have filed their own claims under the Act. As "persons" under the
Act, they would have had standing to sue.
V. THE BUSINESS STANDING TEST IN OTHER STATES: Is THE BUSINESS
ACTING IN A CONSUMER-ORIENTED MANNER?
Other states with consumer fraud statutes similar to the Illinois Act use
a different test to determine whether a business has standing. Both New
44. Following the court in Zinser, it is possible that consumers benefitted from the
insurers' practice of disallowing certain claims by the chiropractors. Disallowing the claims
may have reduced the overall cost of services and may have contributed to better services for
patients. Such a practice is common in today's world of managed care healthcare. Because
the consumers were not parties to the litigation it is impossible to determine whether they
benefitted by granting standing to chiropractors.
45. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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York and New Jersey allow "any person" to bring claims under consumer
fraud acts. In both states, corporations and businesses are included in the
definition of a "person." New York and New Jersey, however, have
developed a different test for business standing. New York and New Jersey
courts recognize that consumer fraud acts were enacted to protect consumers
from exploitation by merchants and manufacturers. Their courts also
recognize that a business may be deceived when it purchases a good or
service. Therefore, New York and New Jersey grant standing to a business
which is acting in a consumer-oriented manner.46
One is acting in a consumer-oriented manner when one does what
individual consumers do, such as buying a good for use in a business. For
example, in Dreier Co., a corporation purchased a computer system based
on a representation that the system would function effectively. After it was
installed, the computer system did not meet expectations. The business had
standing under the New Jersey Act because the Act (buying a computer for
its own use) was similar to a consumer's purchase of a computer.4 7 In
Oswego Laborers' Local 214, the plaintiff union deposited funds with the
defendant bank. The union claimed that the bank made certain misrepresentations during the relationship. The union had standing because its act
(depositing money in a bank) is often done by individual consumers.48
However, New Jersey and other states do not grant standing where a
business is acting in a manner similar to a business, such as when a business
acquires goods for resale.49 These states recognize that a business which

46. See Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, 647
N.E.2d 741 (N.Y. 1995) (allowing suit by business depositor against bank under New York's
statute which allows "any person" to sue); Dreier Co. v. Unitronix Corp., 527 A.2d 875 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (allowing a corporation to sue under New Jersey's statute which
allows "any person" to sue where the defendant allegedly misrepresented the quality of a
computer system); Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 757 P.2d 695, 703 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1988) (allowing plaintiffs who purchased a feed system to sue the seller under the
Idaho statute).
47. See Dreier Co., 527 A.2d at 875.
48. Oswego Laborers'Local 214, 647 N.E.2d at 745.
49. See City Check Cashing, Inc. v. National State Bank, 582 A.2d 809 (N.J. Super
Ct. App. Div. 1990); Boatel Indus. v. Hester, 550 A.2d 389 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988). In
City Check Cashing, the plaintiff check cashing service opened an account at the defendant
bank and the bank supplied the service with cash for its operations. When the bank
discontinued the flow of cash, plaintiff filed suit under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.
Plaintiff lacked standing, however, because plaintiff "was buying cash from defendant at
wholesale to sell to its check-cashing customers at retail." City Check Cashing,582 A.2d at
811. In Boatel Indus., the plaintiff boat dealer purchased a boat from the defendant
manufacturer. When the plaintiff discovered that there were serious problems with the boat's
hull, plaintiff brought a claim under the Maryland Consumer Fraud Act. Plaintiff lacked
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offers goods for resale has remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code
and common law doctrines.
The consumer-oriented manner test forces the court to focus on whether
the business is acting like a consumer. By excluding claims where plaintiffs
are not acting like consumers, the test serves the main purpose of a
consumer fraud act - protecting consumers from exploitation. The
consumer-oriented manner test is also very easy to apply. Determining
whether a business is acting in a consumer-oriented manner is much easier
than determining whether a claim "implicates consumer protection
concerns." Any plaintiff can allege that its claim "implicates consumer
protection concerns," but few will be able to allege that they were acting in
a manner similar to ordinary consumers.
VI. A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM: ILLINOIS SHOULD ADOPT THE
STANDING TEST USED BY NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY

To prevent more businesses like the pharmacy in Sullivan's and the
psychiatrist in Zinser from exploiting the Act, the courts should reinterpret
the requirements for business standing. Businesses are certainly "persons"
under the Act. A business should be able to bring a consumer fraud claim
where it acts in a manner similar to a consumer, such as when it buys a
good or service for its own use. This interpretation of the statute would be
consistent with the interpretations by other states with similar statutes. It is
also consistent with Representative Terzich's statement in the legislative
history that a plaintiff will need to show a connection to "consumer
protection concerns." The phrase "consumer protection concerns" should be
read to mean that a plaintiff must allege that it was acting in a consumeroriented manner. Such a standard best carries out the purpose of the Act,
which is to protect consumers from exploitation.
The consumer-oriented manner standard is also consistent with many
Illinois decisions. For example, in Stogsdill, the plaintiff law firm acted in
a manner similar to a consumer when it opened a checking account at a
bank. The court granted standing. Another example is WE. O'Neil, where
the plaintiff contractor purchased insurance from an insurance company.
The contractor's act - buying insurance - is done by consumers every

standing because the plaintiff was a dealer and intended to offer the boat for resale. Boatel
Industries, 550 A.2d at 397-99. For a more complete discussion on the treatment of business
claims under state comsumer fraud statutes, see Edward X. Clinton, Do Businesses Have
Standing Under State Consumer Fraud Statutes? 20 S.I.U. L. REv. 385, 392-93 (1996).
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day. The outcome of WE. O'Neil, which granted standing, would be the
same under the consumer-oriented manner test."
There is an exception to this reasoning. Illinois courts have consistently granted standing under the Act to a business which claims that another
business has used false advertising to disparage its products.' Standing is
granted on the assumption that false advertising injures consumers. A false
advertising case is similar to Sullivan's and Gadson because the standing of
the business plaintiff depends on alleging injury to consumers who are not
parties to the litigation. However, in a false advertising case, it is much
more likely that granting standing to a business will benefit consumers
because a consumer cannot make an informed decision about a product
based on a false advertisement. A false advertising case is different than
Sullivan's or Gadson because the court can be very confident that the
interests of the business plaintiff and the consumers are consistent. By
contrast, in Gadson and Sullivan's it is doubtful that granting standing to the
business plaintiff served the interests of the consumers. Moreover, the
Illinois legislature has expressly granted standing to a business where it
2
alleges that other consumers were injured by deceptive trade practices.
In all other cases a business plaintiff should be required to prove that it was
acting in a consumer-oriented manner.
The consumer-oriented manner requirement will best protect individual
consumers and'ensure that the Act does not become a pawn in every lawsuit
between businesses. The courts should not forget that the Act was designed
to protect individual consumers from misrepresentations by merchants and
manufacturers. It was not intended to become an additional remedy every
time a business breaks a contract with another business.

50. The outcome in Lake County Grading should also be the same because the
subcontractor was not acting in a consumer-oriented manner when it was installing a sewer
line.
51. See, e.g., Downers Grove Volkswagen, Inc. v. Wigglesworth Imports, Inc., 546
N.E.2d 33 (III. App. Ct. 1989); Empire Home Servs., Inc. v. Carpet America, Inc., 653
N.E.2d 852, 854 (I11.App. Ct. 1995).
52. The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act outlaws false advertising. 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 510/2 (West 1996). A violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
is also a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 505/2 (West
1996).

